Elliott Negin: U.S. Nuclear Power Safety in 2011: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Mr. Lochbaum today released his second annual report, and his overarching conclusion is not that different than last year's: Many of the significant safety lapses at U.S. nuclear plants in 2011 happened because plant owners--and often the NRC--either tolerated known problems or failed to address them adequately….
The 13 plants that experienced special inspections last year were Braidwood and Byron in Illinois,
The serious accidents at the Fermi plant outside Detroit in 1966, Three Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986, and Fukushima Daiichi last year happened when a handful of known, uncorrected problems resulted in a catastrophe," said Lochbaum. "The fact that U.S. plant owners could have avoided nearly all the near-misses in 2011 if they had addressed known problems in a timely manner suggests that they and the NRC have not learned the lessons of these accidents. Someday their luck may run out."

Elliott Negin: U.S. Nuclear Power Safety in 2011: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

The following list of near misses are taken from Mr. Lochbaum’s work, The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety, 2011 Report: Living on Borrowed Time.  It is available on line at:   
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_risk/safety/nrc-and-nuclear-power-safety-annual.html
NUCLEAR NEAR-MISSES IN 2011
Reactor & Location
Owner
Highlights
Braidwood
Joliet, IL
Exelon
After NRC inspectors questioned the practice of draining water from portions of the essential service water piping to the auxiliary feedwater pumps (to avoid corrosion damage from untreated water leaking past isolation valves), analysis revealed that this key emergency system might not function during an accident. The NRC team also discovered that workers failed to declare an emergency in response to the recurring failure of all control room alarms.
Byron
Rockford, IL
Exelon
After NRC inspectors questioned the practice of draining water from portions of the essential service water piping to the auxiliary feedwater pumps (to avoid corrosion damage from untreated water leaking past isolation valves), analysis revealed this key emergency system might not function during an accident.
Callaway
Jefferson City, MO
Union Electric Co.
Routine testing of an emergency pump intended to prove that it was capable of performing its safety functions during an accident actually degraded the pump. The pump’s manufacturer recommended against running the pump at low speeds, but this recommendation was ignored during the tests.
Cooper
Nebraska City, NE
Nebraska Public Power District
Workers replacing detectors used to monitor the reactor core during low-power conditions were
Millstone Unit 2
Waterford, CT
Dominion
Despite a dry run of an infrequently performed test on the control room simulator and other precautionary measures, errors during the actual test produced an unexpected and uncontrolled increase in the reactor’s power level.
Monticello
Minneapolis, MN
Nuclear Management Co.
Routine testing of an emergency pump intended to prove that it was capable of performing its safety functions during an accident actually degraded the pump. The pump’s manufacturer recommended against running the pump at low speeds, but this recommendation was ignored during the tests.
North Anna
Richmond, VA
Dominion
An earthquake of greater magnitude than the plant was designed to withstand caused both reactors to automatically shut down from full power.
Oconee
Greenville, SC
Duke Energy
Workers discovered that an emergency system installed in 1983 to protect the reactor core from overheating in the event of a station blackout, pipe break, fire, or flood would be disabled by the high temperature inside the containment during such an accident. The high temperature would cause electrical components within the emergency system to fail.
Palisades
South Haven, MI
Entergy
When a pump used to provide cooling water to emergency equipment failed in September 2009 because of stress corrosion cracking of recently installed parts, workers replaced the parts with identical parts. The replacement parts failed again in 2011, disabling one of three pumps.
Palisades
South Haven, MI
Entergy
Workers troubleshooting faulty indicator lights showing the position of the emergency airlock door inadvertently shut off power to roughly half the instruments and controls in the main control room. The loss of control power triggered the automatic shutdown of the reactor and complicated operators’response.
Perry
Cleveland, OH
FirstEnergy
Problems during the replacement of a detector used to monitor the reactor core during low-power conditions exposed workers to potentially high levels of radiation.
Pilgrim
Plymouth, MA
Entergy
Security problems prompted the NRC to conduct a special inspection. Details of the problems, their causes, and their fixes are not publicly available.
Pilgrim
Plymouth, MA
Entergy
When restarting the reactor after a refueling outage, workers overreacted to indications that the water inside the reactor was heating up too rapidly, and lost control of the reactor. The plant’s safety systems automatically kicked in to shut down the reactor.
Turkey Point Unit 3
Miami, FL
Florida Power and Light Co.
A valve failure stopped the flow of cooling water to equipment, including the reactor coolant pump motors and the cooling system for the spent fuel pool.
Wolf Creek
Burlington, KS
Wolf Creak Nuclear Operating Co.
Workers overlooked numerous signs that gas had leaked into the piping of safety systems, impairing the performance of pumps and flow-control valves.