Final report blasts oversight by company, governments
Nov. 21, 2013
By Troy A. Bruzewski
Editor
BELVIDERE – The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) concluded its investigation into the 2009 explosion at NDK Crystal and the recently-released findings underscore a total failures by plant’s parent company and government agencies obligated to protect the public, in monitoring the facility.
Even worse, the investigation confirmed that NDK was warned about potential danger to surrounding businesses and specifically referenced the Tollway Oasis gas station where a bystander was killed by debris launched by the explosion.
The plant – located at 701 Crystal Parkway – had eight 50-foot pressure vessels used to produce synthetic crystals. According to the CSB, corrosion in those vessels led to an explosion so powerful that building fragments were launched hundreds of feet. One section, weighing over 8,000 pounds, crashed through two concrete walls and traveled 435 feet, hitting an adjacent business office.
“The force of the impact pushed the wall inward, causing furniture to shift and ceiling tiles to fall (in the adjacent office),” the report stated.
The thrust from the escaping liquid, caused the base of the Bessel to violently shear from its foundation and send pieces of structural steel into the parking lot of the nearby gas station, which killed the bystander.
NDK had eight of these vessels that were designed and built for crystal-growing operations, meaning the vessels were to have the proper materials and thickness to withstand high-operating pressures. According to the CSB report, a number of the NDK vessels did not meet standards set by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and lack of inspection allowed for corrosion to go unnoticed.
In 2002, NDK petitioned the State Boiler and Pressure Vessel Safety Division for a special exemption allowing it to continue operations without adhering to code, which was approved. The vessel designer – Engineering Pressure Systems – advised NDK to have annual inspections performed. That advice, according to the CSB, was ignored.
“NDK, nor the state of Illinois, performed regular inspections,” the report stated. “Stress-corrosion cracking went uninspected and undetected, for years.”
It was also determined the coating used on the vessels to protect them from corrosion, did not provide the protection NDK promised it would.
“The CSB learned that NDK never actually tested, or verified, the effectiveness of the coating to prevent corroding,” the report stated.
After an incident in 2007 that led to an uncontrolled leak of caustic material, NDK’s insurer initiated an investigation that provided directives which could have avoided the 2009 incident and saved a life. The investigator in 2007 “had serious reservations” about the potential of “catastrophic scenarios” if the facility resumed operations with the vessels, determined to have “improper design, fabrication and material selection.” The investigation results also referred to potential danger to the plant’s surroundings, even mentioning the gas station where the bystander was killed.
“At every level, the risk of catastrophic vessel failure was overlooked and public safety, literally and figuratively, fell through the cracks,” CSB chairperson Rafael Moure-Eraso said.
Not only was NDK allowed to resume without addressing its code violations or following the recommendations of its insurer, but it did so with almost no oversight by the state.
“The state of Illinois performed only inspections of accessible external areas,” the report stated. “No certified inspector ever inspected the vessels.”
The CSB also determined the facility’s location was poorly selected, stating it was “unsafely sited in a light industrial area, near other businesses and the interstate” and that the city “has no additional requirements for examining the impact” of such an emergency situation. In fact, the installation and operation of the pressure vessels for the manufacturing process, was not included in the application or any documentation submitted to the city during the permitting process.
Several recommendations are listed at the conclusion of the CSB report, but the entity itself does not issue fines or citations. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, with the objective of investigating industrial chemical accidents.
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